































































































































































## ŞEKİL: 1- İHALE YÖNTEMLERİ



### ŞEKİL: 1- İHALE YÖNTEMLERİ (DEVAM)



**Kazanım**= $V_i - b_i$

$V_i$ =En yüksek değer

$B_1$ = En yüksek teklif

**KAYNAK:** Feldman ve Mehra,1993 esas alınarak tarafımızdan geliştirilmiştir (u.e.)



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